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THE MOR CRYPTOSYSTEM AND FINITE p-GROUPS
AYAN MAHALANOBIS
Abstract. The ElGamal cryptosystem is the most widely used public key cryptosystem. It
uses the discrete logarithm problem as the cryptographic primitive. The MOR cryptosystem
is a similar cryptosystem. It uses the discrete logarithm problem in the automorphism group
as the cryptographic primitive. In this paper, we study the MOR cryptosystem for finite
p-groups. The study is complete for p′-automorphisms. For p-automorphisms there are
some interesting open problems.
1. Introduction
This is a study of the MOR cryptosystem using finite p-groups. Similar studies were done
by this author [11, 12]. The MOR cryptosystem, that we are going to describe in details
shortly, works with the automorphism group of a group. As a matter of fact, we do not even
need a group. Any finitely presented structure on which automorphisms can be defined will
do. We can define the MOR cryptosystem on that structure. However, a MOR cryptosystem
might not be secure or implementation-friendly. So this paper can be seen as a search for
favorable groups for the MOR cryptosystem in the class of finite p-groups.
Once we decide that we will look into the class of p-groups, an obvious question surfaces.
Are there p-groups on which the cryptosystem is secure? Once the answer is yes, then is it
any better than the existing one? So we have three questions is front of us:
1: Are there favorable p-groups?
2: Is the cryptosystem secure1 on those groups?
3: Is the cryptosystem faster on those groups compared to a suitably defined ElGamal
cryptosystem?
To answer these questions, we had to divide the automorphisms in two different classes.
One, p-automorphisms and the other p′-automorphisms. For p′-automorphisms we show
that there are secure MOR cryptosystems on a p-group. However, they offer no advantage
than working with matrices over the finite field Fp. So, after reading this paper, one might
argue and rightfully so: instead of using p′-automorphisms and p-group, why not just use
matrices of the right size?
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1There are many different definitions of security, we use the basic one – find m, from the automorphism
φ and its power φm.
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The case for p-automorphisms is little complicated and we say upfront that we have not
been able to analyze it completely. The case of p-automorphisms break down into two sub-
cases and we were able to deal with one easily. The other case is very interesting and we
were able to shed some light into that with an example. However, a detailed analysis is
missing and we leave it as ongoing research. The situation with p-automorphisms compared
to p′-automorphisms is in many ways similar to the modular representation theory compared
to the ordinary representation theory. The later is much easier to deal with than the former.
2. Definitions and Notations
Most of the definitions used in this paper are standard and in Gorenstein [3]. However,
we define a few of them for the convenience of the reader. All groups in this paper are finite.
We use p for a prime and q for a prime-power.
Definition 2.1 (p′-automorphisms and p-automorphisms). An automorphism φ of a p-group
G is a p-automorphism if its order is power of p and p′-automorphism if its order is coprime
to p.
In general, it is not true that an automorphism is either a p-automorphism or a p′-
automorphism. However, for the purpose of understanding the security of a MOR cryp-
tosystem, due to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [5, Section 2.9], an automorphism is either
a p-automorphism or a p′-automorphism.
Definition 2.2 (Special p-group). Usually, a special p-group is defined to be a p-group such
that Z(G) = G′ = Φ(G) and is elementary-abelian. Here G′, Z(G) and Φ(G) are the
commutator subgroup, the center and the Frattini subgroup respectively. However, it is not
very hard to show that the elemetary-abelian part is redundant.
Definition 2.3 (Favorable p-group). A p-group G is called a favorable p-group, if there is a
non-identity p′-automorphism φ of the group, such that, if the automorphism fixes a proper
subgroup H of G, it is the identity on H.
A good example of a favorable p-group is the elementary-abelian p-group, denoted by G.
Any automorphism of that can be realized as a matrix. If the characteristic polynomial of
an automorphism φ is irreducible, then there are no φ-invariant proper subgroups of G. So
the above condition is true vacuously.
A curious reader might find the requirement “p′-automorphism φ” unnecessary. The reason
for the restriction is, for p′-automorphism favorable p-groups is the right notion to look at.
If there is a subgroup that is fixed by φ, one can study the discrete logarithm problem on the
action of the automorphism on that subgroup, unless the automorphism is the identity on
that subgroup. We will see, in the case of p′-automorphisms, the discrete logarithm problem
in the automorphism group translates to the discrete logarithm problem in non-singular
matrices. In the case of p-automorphisms, it is not clear if the notion of favorable p-group
is the best way to go. We simply don’t have enough examples of secure MOR cryptosystem
using p-automorphisms of p-groups yet. So we refrain ourselves from defining favorable
p-groups for p-automorphisms.
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3. The MOR cryptosystem
In this section, we provide a somewhat detailed description of a small but important
portion of public key cryptography. We start with a cryptographic primitive – the discrete
logarithm problem. The standard reference for public key cryptography is Hoffstein et. al. [5].
Definition 3.1 (The discrete logarithm problem). Let G = 〈g〉 be a finite cyclic group of
prime order. We are given g and gm for some m ∈ N. The discrete logarithm problem is to
find the smallest m.
The discrete logarithm problem is neither secure or insecure. It being secure or insecure
is a property of the presentation of the group. The property of being secure or insecure is
not a group theoretic property, it is not invariant under isomorphism.
The discrete logarithm problem is the easiest in prime subgroups of (Zn,+) and is con-
sidered secure in prime subgroups of the multiplicative group of a finite field F×q and is
considered really secure in a prime order subgroup of the rational points of an elliptic curve.
The difference in security between finite fields and points on elliptic curve is, there is no
known sub-exponential attack against the elliptic curves.
A concept related to the discrete logarithm problem is the Diffie-Hellman problem.
We have the same G as before, this problem is: given g, gm
′
and gm
′′
compute gm
′m′′ . It is
clear that if we know how to solve the discrete logarithm problem, i.e., we can find m′ (or
m′′), we can then solve the Diffie-Hellman problem. The reverse direction is not known.
The most popular and prolific public key cryptosystem is the ElGamal cryptosystem. It
works in any cyclic subgroup of a group G. However, it might not be secure in any group.
3.1. Description of the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Private Key: m, m ∈ N.
Public Key: g and gm.
Encryption.
a: To send a message (plaintext) a ∈ G Bob computes gr and gmr for a random r ∈ N.
b: The ciphertext is (gr, gmra).
Decryption.
a: Alice knows m, so if she receives the ciphertext (gr, gmra), she computes gmr from
gr and then g−mr and then computes a from gmra.
It is known that the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman
problem [5, Proposition 2.10]. A very similar idea is the MOR cryptosystem.
3.2. Description of the MOR cryptosystem. Let G = 〈g1, g2, . . . , gτ 〉, τ ∈ N be a finite
group and φ a non-trivial automorphism of G. Alice’s keys are as follows:
Private Key: m, m ∈ N.
Public Key: {φ(gi)}
τ
i=1 and {φ
m(gi)}
τ
i=1.
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Encryption.
a: To send a message (plaintext) a ∈ G Bob computes φr and φmr for a random r ∈ N.
b: The ciphertext is ({φr(gi)}
τ
i=1 , φ
mr(a)).
Decryption.
a: Alice knows m, so if she receives the ciphertext (φr, φmr(a)), she computes φmr from
φr and then φ−mr and then computes a from φmr(a).
Alice knows the order of the automorphism φ, she can use the identity φt−1 = φ−1 whenever
φt = 1 to compute φ−mr.
It is easy to see the following: if one can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem in 〈φ〉, he can
break the MOR cryptosystem. This follows from the fact that φr and φm are public. If one
can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem, one can compute φmr and get the plaintext. The next
theorem proves the converse.
Theorem 3.1. If there is an oracle that can decrypt arbitrary ciphertext for the MOR cryp-
tosystem, one can solve the Diffie-Hellman problem in 〈φ〉.
Proof. Assume that there is an oracle that can decrypt arbitrary MOR ciphertext. Now
recall that a = φ−mr (φmr(a)). Now suppose we have φm
′
and φm
′′
and we want to compute
φm
′m′′ . Then tell the oracle that φm
′
is the public key and
(
φm
′′
, gi
)
is the ciphertext. The
oracle will return φ−m
′m′′(gi) as the plaintext. Once this game is played for i = 1, 2, . . . , τ .
We know φ−m
′m′′(gi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , τ and hence φ
m′m′′ . Thus solving the Diffie-Hellman
problem in 〈φ〉. •
In this paper we are primarily interested in exploring finite p-groups for the purpose
of building a secure MOR cryptosystem. As is well known, security and computational
efficiency goes hand in hand. So unless we explore the computational complexity of the
MOR cryptosystem, a security analysis is useless. So there are two questions that we will
explore in this paper:
a: Is it possible to build a secure MOR cryptosystem using finite p-groups?
b: Does this MOR cryptosystem has any advantage over existing cryptosystems?
Before we answer these questions, we need to explain one aspect of the security of the discrete
logarithm problem. It is easy to see, using the Chinese remainder theorem, that the discrete
logarithm problem in any cyclic group can be reduced to a discrete logarithm problem in its
Sylow subgroups. Then a discrete logarithm problem in the Sylow subgroup can be further
reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in a group of prime power [5, Section 2.9]. The
end result is: the security of the discrete logarithm problem in a group is the security of the
discrete logarithm problem in the largest prime-order subgroup in that group. In practice,
the group considered for an efficient and secure implementation of the discrete logarithm
problem is a group of prime order2. From the above argument, it is clear that we should
only study automorphisms of prime order for the MOR cryptosystem.
2The reader must have noticed that in the definition of the discrete logarithm problem we used groups of
prime order.
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One way to study automorphisms of a finite p-group for the MOR cryptosystem is using
linear methods in nilpotent groups [6, Chapter VIII]. That is our principal objective in this
paper. The idea is to find a series of subgroups such that automorphisms act linearly either
on the subgroups or the quotients. We will soon assume, if a subgroup is fixed under an
automorphism then it is the identity on that subgroup. With this assumption, we only have
to look at the action of an automorphism on the sections of the series.
With these in mind, we look at the exponent-p central series of a finite p-group G. The
series is defined as follows:
G = G0 DG1 D . . .DGk = 1
where Gi+1 = [G,Gi]G
p
i . This series is well known to have elementary-abelian quotients and
is used in many aspects of computations with finite p-groups [14].
There are two possible orders of an automorphism of a p-group for the MOR cryptosystems:
i: The automorphism φ is of order p.
ii: The order of φ is a prime different from p, i.e., a p′-automorphism.
This can again be subdivided into four different cases:
a: The automorphism is of order p and is identity on all the quotients of the exponent-p
central series.
b: The automorphism is of order p and is not identity on at least one section of the
exponent-p central series.
c: The automorphism is of order p′ and is not identity on at least one section of the
exponent-p central series.
d: The automorphism is of order p′ and is identity on all sections of the exponent-p
central series.
Recall that G1 is the Frattini subgroup Φ(G). A well known theorem of Burnside says that:
Theorem 3.2 (Burnside). Let φ be an automorphism of a group G. If gcd (o(φ), |Φ(G)|) = 1
and φ induces the identity automorphism on G/Φ(G), φ is the identity automorphism on G.
Proof. For a proof see [1, Theorem 1.15] or [3, Theorem 5.1.4]. •
This says, the case c above reduces to: the automorphism φ is of order p′ and is not identity
on G/Φ(G). In this case φ acts on G/Φ(G) linearly and the discrete logarithm problem in
φ deduces to the discrete logarithm problem in matrices over Fp. The size of the matrix is
the same as the cardinality of a set of minimal generators of the p-group.
It is also well known, if d is the case then φ is the identity [3, Theorem 5.3.2]. So there is
no point studying d.
So we have three cases to look at a, b and c above.
It is well known that usually, the exception being groups of prime order, p-groups come
with lots of subgroups and normal subgroups. The most difficult issue that one faces in
choosing a p-group and the automorphism φ for the MOR cryptosystem is the presence of
subgroups of the p-group which is fixed by φ. If this happens, the discrete logarithm problem
in the automorphism φ is reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in the restriction of φ to
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that subgroup. This reduction is most undesirable. On the other hand, working with non-
abelian p-groups this reduction is bound to happen. For example, the commutator and the
center are non-trivial characteristic subgroups. The way out of this situation is to ensure, if
φ fixes any subgroup then it is the identity on that subgroup. Once this condition is imposed,
we will see that favorable groups with p′-automorphism are reduced to either the elementary
abelian p-group or the class of p-groups G with G′ = Z(G) = Φ(G) and Φ(G) is elementary
abelian. Here G′ is the commutator subgroup, Z(G) is the center and Φ(G) is the Frattini
subgroup of G. These two class of groups together are known as the special p-groups.
4. MOR cryptosystems on finite p-groups using p′-automorphisms
In this section we look at the MOR cryptosystem over finite p-groups with p′-automorphisms.
Our standard reference for group theory is Gorenstein [3] and for linear algebra is Roman [15].
We start with a generalization of a celebrated theorem from the odd-order paper.
Theorem 4.1. A solvable group G possesses a characteristic subgroup C with the following
properties:
: Subgroup C is nilpotent with nilpotency class less than or equal 2.
: Z(C) is a maximal characteristic abelian subgroup of G.
: CG(C) = Z(C).
: Every nontrivial p′-automorphism of G induces a non-trivial automorphism on C.
For a proof see [1, Theorem 14.1]. The subgroup C is called a Thompson critical subgroup.
We will refer to it as a critical subgroup. There can be more than one critical subgroup in
a group. It is clear from the theorem above, in our search for favorable p-groups, we should
look at p-groups whose only critical subgroup is the whole group. We will call those groups
self-critical. Since a self-critical group is of class at most 2, we should look at p-groups
of class at most 2. Now if p is odd, in a p-group of class 2, (xy)p = xpyp. This makes the
subgroup Ω1(G) of exponent p. Since Ω1(G) is characteristic the following corollary follows
immediately.
Corollary 4.2. For an odd prime p, favorable p-groups are of class at most 2 with exponent
p.
Before we go any further we need to state a well known theorem due to Hall and Higman [4,
Theorem C]. The proof is available in many standard textbooks [3, Theorem 5.3.7], so we
won’t reproduce it.
Theorem 4.3. Let G be a favorable p-group, then G/G′ is elementary abelian.
To summarize, favorable p-groups are of class at most 2 and G/G′ is elementary-abelian.
It follows that G′ ≤ Z(G). Then both G/G′ and G/Z(G) are elementary abelian p-groups.
We also have a p′-automorphism φ, such that, if φ fixes a subgroup of G, it is the identity
on that subgroup. In particular, φ is the identity on G′ and Z(G).
There are two different ways to look at this situation:
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Ordinary representation theory. Let A = 〈φ〉 be the subgroup generated by φ. Since
φ is a p′-automorphism, the order of A is coprime to the order of the group G. We have a
coprime action of A on G. In particular, we have a linear action of A on V = G/G′. Since
this action is coprime we have the celebrated Maschke’s theorem [3, Theorem 3.3.1] at our
disposal. The theorem states, if we have an A-invariant proper subspace W ⊂ V , it has an
A-invariant complement. In other words there is an A-invariant subspace W ′ of V such that
V = W ⊕W ′.
Linear algebra. Another way to look at the same situation is by linear algebra. Let
V = G/G′. Clearly V is a finite dimensional vector-space over Fp. Corresponding to a
linear transformation φ of V , we can define scalar multiplication such that V is a finitely
generated module over the principal ideal domain Fp[x] [15, Chapter 7]. We denote this
module by Vφ. The reason we are interested in this module Vφ is that the submodules of
Vφ are the φ-invariant subspaces of V . With this we have the full force of the theory of
finitely generated modules over a principal ideal domain at our disposition; especially the
decomposition theorem.
The minimal polynomial of φ is a generator of the annihilator ideal of Vφ in Fp[x]. We
denote it by mφ and assume it to be monic. Let mφ = f
m1
1 (x)f
m2
2 (x) . . . f
mk
k (x) be the
decomposition of mφ as product of irreducible monic polynomials. One can write Vφ =
V1⊕V2⊕ . . .⊕Vk where a generator of the annihilator ideal of each primary component Vi is
fmii . Each Vi can either be cyclic or can be broken down as direct sum of cyclic modules. This
theory is very well-known and successful, so we will omit the details and ask any interested
reader to consult a textbook in linear algebra – Roman [15] being one of them.
Lemma 4.4. Let φ be a non-identity p′-automorphism on V , where V is a finite-dimensional
vector space over Fp; such that, if φ fixes a subspace of V then it is the identity on that
subspace. The following is true:
a. The characteristic polynomial χφ of φ is irreducible.
b. The module Vφ is simple.
Proof. Recall that Vφ is a finitely generated module over a principal ideal domain Fp[x]. Let
mφ be the minimal polynomial of Vφ. Assume that mφ = f
m1
1 (x)f
m2
2 (x) . . . f
mk
k (x), where
each fi(x) is monic irreducible over Fp and each mi is a non-negative integer. Define the set
Vi = {v ∈ Vφ : f
mi
i (φ)v = 0}
Then the fundamental theorem of finitely generated module over a principal ideal theorem
says that Vφ = V1 ⊕ V2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Vk. Now assume for a moment that k is greater than 1.
Then we have Vφ as direct sum of non-trivial submodules. Recall that submodules of Vφ
are the φ-invariant subspaces of V . Then we have that V is a direct sum of two φ-invariant
subspaces of V . So φ acts like identity on both these subspaces and hence is the identity on
V . So this subspace decomposition is impossible, forcing k to be 1.
We have deduced that mφ = f(x)
l where f(x) is monic irreducible and l is a positive
integer. If l is greater than 1, take the subspace V ′ =
{
v ∈ Vφ : f
l−1(φ)v = 0
}
. Also
construct the subgroup A = 〈φ〉. Since gcd(|A|, p) = 1, from Maschke’s theorem the subspace
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V ′ has a complement. This means that there is another A-invariant subspace V ′′ such that
V = V ′ ⊕ V ′′. Then using an argument similar to the one in last paragraph, we show that
l = 1 and the minimal polynomial mφ is irreducible.
From the above discussion it follows clearly that the module Vφ is cyclic with irreducible
minimal polynomial. Since a cyclic module with irreducible minimal polynomial is non-
derogatory [15, Theorem 7.11], we have the characteristic polynomial the same as the minimal
polynomial.
The fact the module is simple, follows the fact that the minimal polynomial of any sub-
module will divide the minimal polynomial of the module and the minimal polynomial of
the module is irreducible. •
It is easy to prove a partial converse of the above lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Let φ be a linear transformation on the finite dimensional vector space over
Fq. If the characteristic polynomial χφ is irreducible, the only φ-invariant subspaces of V
are 0 and V .
Proof. We will consider Vφ as a module over Fq[x]. Since χφ is irreducible it is also the
minimal polynomial. Now if S is a submodule of Vφ, then its minimal polynomial will divide
χφ. Since χφ is irreducible we have a proof. •
This lemma is the most useful lemma in this whole paper. This paper is in search of
favorable p-groups and the corresponding automorphism. One way, and probably the easiest
way, is to look at the characteristic polynomial corresponding to an automorphism. If that
characteristic polynomial is irreducible, we have our favorable p-group and the necessary
automorphism.
Theorem 4.6. A favorable p-group G is a special p-group.
Proof. We already know that G is of class at most 2 and V = G/G′ is an elementary-abelian
p-group. Let φ be a p′-automorphism group automorphism, such that, if is fixes a proper
subgroup of G, then it is the identity on that subgroup. Since G′ is characteristic, φ is the
identity on G′. Consider the module Vφ over Fp[x] corresponding to φ. Then from the lemma
above we know that the characteristic polynomial χφ is irreducible and Vφ is simple.
In any finite p-group, G′ ⊆ Φ(G) and from above G′ ⊆ Z(G). To show G′ = Z(G), notice
that Vφ is a simple module over Fp[x] and all submodules are φ-invariant subspaces. So
Z(G)/G′ cannot be a nontrivial submodule. Similar is the case with Φ(G).
So if we assume that G is not elementary-abelian, then G′ = Z(G) = Φ(G). •
At this point it is clear, to build a secure and optimal MOR cryptosystem with non-abelian
p-groups one should look at special p-groups and an automorphism φ such that φ is identity
on all subgroup it fixes. In particular φ must centralize Φ(G), so smaller the Φ(G) the better.
So it is clear that we should look for groups with Φ(G) as small as possible. We conclude that
for a non-abelian p-group (p odd) and p′-automorphisms the best group is an extra-special
p-group of prime exponent. For abelian p-groups, we should look only at elementary-abelian
p-groups. For p even, we still have the extra-special groups but we can use any exponent.
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5. The MOR cryptosystem and elementary abelian p-group
As is well known, an elementary abelian p-group is a vector space over Fp the field of p
elements. So one way to look at MOR cryptosystems over an elementary abelian group is
MOR cryptosystems over a vector space. If we fix a basis for the vector space, any linear
transformation gives rise to a matrix. So the discrete logarithm problem in invertible linear
transformations turns out to be the discrete logarithm problem over non-singular matrices.
So we need to say a few things about that. Before we do that, we also need to remind
our reader that security and speed goes hand in hand. One reason, the discrete logarithm
problem in matrices was avoided in cryptography was the belief that matrix exponentiation
is much more expensive. The security advantage we gain from the discrete logarithm problem
in matrices does not outweigh the cost of matrix exponentiation. This view was put down
by Menezes & Wu [13]. However with the recent advances in matrix exponentiation by
Leedham-Green [9], the above argument is no longer valid. We get into the details of this
argument in this section.
5.1. Solving the discrete logarithm problem in non-singular matrices. Let g and
gm belongs to GL(d, q), the discrete logarithm problem is to find m. This problem can be
easy and hard. For uni-triangular matrices, i.e., matrices with one on the diagonal and
arbitrary field element on the upper half and zero on the lower half, it is very easy. On the
other hand, with matrices with irreducible characteristic polynomial, the discrete logarithm
problem is hard.
Following is the work of Menezes & Wu [13], which is the best known algorithm to solve
the discrete logarithm problem in matrices. This algorithm is basically a reduction of the
discrete logarithm problem in GL(d, q) to a finite (possibly trivial) extension of Fq.
5.2. The Menezes-Wu algorithm.
: Input: g and gm.
: Output: m.
: From g, compute the characteristic polynomial χg of g.
: From gm, compute the characteristic polynomial χgm of g
m.
Let {α1, α2, . . . , αd} be the characteristic roots of g. This list might contain repeating en-
tries. The characteristic roots lie in some finite (possibly trivial) extension of Fq. Let
{β1, β2, . . . , βd} be the characteristic roots of g
m. This list might contain repeating entries.
The roots lie in some finite (possibly trivial) extension of Fq.
Then {β1, β2, . . . , βd} is
{
αmi1 , α
m
i2
, . . . , αmid
}
, where (i1, i2, . . . , id) is (1, 2, . . . , d) permuted.
Note that there is no obvious way to order characteristic roots, but following Menezes and
Wu, we will assume that this permutation is not going to offer much resistance in computing
m. In other words, we assume that we can find αi and βj such that α
m
i = βj . Once we
have this one can solve for m mod o(αi), where o(αi) is the multiplicative order of αi. From,
solving the required numbers of discrete logarithm problems in the suitable extensions and
then applying the Chinese remainder theorem, one can solve the discrete logarithm problem
in non-singular matrices. Note that the αi and subsequently the βj will be in some extension
9
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field (possibly trivial) of Fq. The largest extension possible is Fqd and this happens when
the characteristic polynomial is irreducible.
The most serious attack on the discrete logarithm problem in a finite field is the sub-
exponential attack like the index-calculus attack. In this attack, if we are solving the discrete
logarithm problem in Fqd, the time-complexity is exp
(
(c+ o(1))(log qd)
1
3 (log log qd)
2
3
)
, where
c is a constant, see [16] and [8, Section 4]. It is clear, larger the d more secure is the
discrete logarithm problem in matrices. So we can now safely conclude, to work with the
discrete logarithm problem in matrices one should work with matrices with irreducible
characteristic polynomial.
5.3. Exponentiation in non-singular matrices. This section is a brief introduction to an
amazing algorithm by Leedham-Green [9, Section 10] to compute gm for some g ∈ GL(d, q).
We only deal with the case where the characteristic polynomial χg of g is irreducible.
Algorithm 5.1 (Leedham-Green).
Input: a matrix g of size d over a finite field Fq and a positive integer m.
Output: gm
: Find a matrix P such that B = P−1gP is in the Frobenius normal form.
: Determine the minimal polynomial m(x) of B. Since the Smith normal form is sparse,
it is easy to compute the minimal polynomial – it takes O(d2) field multiplications.
: Compute tm mod m(t) in F [t]/m(t) as l(t).
: Compute C = l(B)
: Return PCP−1.
Notice that the objective of the above algorithm was to compute the power of an arbitrary
matrix. In our case, for a MOR cryptosystem the matrix is not arbitrary, we can choose
our matrix. So one can first choose an irreducible polynomial m of degree d over Fq. Then
choose g to be the companion matrix for that polynomial m. Since the minimal polynomial
divides the characteristic polynomial, the minimal polynomial is m as well. So the first two
steps and the last step in the above algorithm becomes redundant.
Once m is irreducible in the above algorithm the quotient F[t]/m(t) is a field. So the third
step is essentially an exponentiation in the field Fqd. So apart from computing the C in the
above algorithm, exponentiation of a matrix with irreducible characteristic polynomial is the
same as exponentiation in the finite field Fqd.
The following is now clear: the discrete logarithm problem in GL(d, q) is almost the same,
both in terms of security and speed, to a discrete logarithm problem in Fdq . Note that this
conclusion is remarkably different than that of Menezes & Wu [13], where they write-off
completely the discrete logarithm problem in matrices.
Next we show that elementary-abelian p-groups are favorable p-groups.
Lemma 5.2. Let V be a vector space over Fp. Let φ be a non-singular linear transformation
on V . If p|o(φ), then V has a proper φ-invariant subspace.
10
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Proof. Let A = 〈φ〉. Then the given condition implies that p||A|. Considering the fact that
any finite abelian group is the direct product of its Sylow subgroups, we see that one can
write φ = φpφp′. Where φp and φp′ are p and p
′ non-trivial automorphism respectively. From
the fact that (xq − 1) = (x− 1)q for any p-power q, we see that all the eigenvalues of φp are
1 ∈ Fp. Let E be the eigenspace of 1 in V . Clearly E is a proper subspace of V . Let v ∈ E .
Then φpφp′(v) = φp′φp(v), which implies φpφp′(v) = φp′(v). This proves that φp′(v) ∈ E . So
E is a φ-invariant proper subspace of V . •
Theorem 5.3. An elementary-abelian p-group is a favorable p-group.
Proof. An elementary abelian p-group V is a vector space over Fp. Then the automorphism
group of V is GL(V ). Let φ be an automorphism with irreducible characteristic polynomial.
Then φ is a p′-automorphism. Then Lemma 4.5 proves the rest. •
6. The extra-special p-groups and its automorphism group
As we saw before, if we are dealing with p′-automorphisms, there are only two interesting
class of finite p-groups. One is the elementary abelian p-group and the other are the extra-
special p-groups. The case for extra special p-groups is interesting, because it provides us with
non-abelian p-groups which is presented in the power-commutator form and provides us with
a secure MOR cryptosystem, thus showing that abstract presentations can be useful. As we
will see, the security with p′-automorphisms reduces to the discrete logarithm problem in non-
singular matrices. This enables us to argue that working with p′-automorphisms of a p-group,
one has no advantage from working with matrices. However, the case with p-automorphisms
is not quite settled yet. We will see, as an example with the central automorphisms of the
extra-special p-groups that there are some potential with p-groups. The potential is the
impossibility of the reduction to matrices, which killed the p′-automorphisms.
6.1. Extra-special p-groups. It is well known that any special p-group is of exponent at
most p2. We saw earlier that for odd prime p we can concentrate on groups of exponent p.
So for an odd prime p our principal interest is in the extra-special p-group of exponent p.
Our principal reference is Gorenstein [3, Section 5.5]. We briefly summarize few facts about
the extra-special p group of exponent p denoted by G.
: The order of G is p2n+1 for some positive integer n. The cardinality of the minimal
set of generators is 2n and we denote that set by {x1, y1, x2, y2, . . . , xn, yn}. There is
a relation [xi, yi] = z, where Z(G) = 〈z〉 and z
p = 1. Furthermore, [xi, xj ] = 1 and
[xi, yj] = 1 for i 6= j.
: The group G is the central product of n copies of the group of order p3 given by
〈x, y, z | xp = yp = zp = 1, [x, z] = 1, [y, z] = 1, [x, y] = z〉.
: In the group G, G = G′ = Φ(G) and is cyclic of order p.
In a p-group, finding all automorphisms is often a very hard job. However, for an extra-special
p-groups it is not that hard. The automorphisms were studied extensively by Winter [17].
The study of automorphisms of an extra-special p-group is not that hard because of a bilinear
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map B : G/G′×G/G′ → Fp. The map is defined as follows, let x¯, y¯ ∈ G/G
′, then [x, y] = za
for some integer a. Then B(x¯, y¯) = a¯, where a¯ = a mod p. It is known that B is an
alternating, non-degenerate bilinear form on G/G′.
We will not do a detailed presentation of the automorphisms of the extra-special p-group
of prime exponent. An interested reader can find that in Winter [17]. However, to facilitate
further discussion we have to describe them briefly.
Since an extra-special p group is of class 2, we have that [xn, y] = [x, y]n. Recall that
the center Z(G) is of prime order and any automorphism of Z(G) can be lifted to an
automorphism of G. So we have a complete description of the automorphisms of G, that are
not identity on Z(G).
So now we have to concentrate on the automorphisms that fix Z(G). It was shown by
Winter that an automorphism φ of G is an automorphism of G/Z(G) if and only if it is the
identity on Z(G).
It was further shown that for prime exponent, the automorphisms that fix Z(G) is the
symplectic group Sp(2n, p). Winter denotes this subgroup of the automorphism group by H
and has shown that it is a normal subgroup of the automorphism group.
To summarize, there are two kinds of automorphisms:
a: Automorphisms that are not the identity on the center Z(G) of G. Since, any
automorphism of the center can be extended to an automorphism of the whole group,
and the center is cyclic. We have a complete understanding of these automorphisms.
They are uninteresting to our cause.
b: One that are identity on the center. These automorphisms form a normal subgroup
of the automorphism group of G. We will call them H .
For obvious reasons we are interested in b above. Let φ be an automorphism that central-
izes the center. Winter has shown that, φ¯ : G/Z(G) → G/Z(G) is an automorphism of
G/Z(G) preserving the bilinear form B. We will abuse the notation a little bit and call the
automorphism on the central quotient φ as well.
An interesting normal subgroup of H is the group of inner automorphisms I. Using the
fact that the commutator G′ ⊆ Z(G) and the identity ab = ba[a, b] for any a, b ∈ G, it is
clear that an inner automorphism is of the form
xi 7→ xiz
di
yi 7→ yiz
d′i where 0 ≤ di, d
′
i < p.
From the fact, the group of the inner automorphisms I is isomorphic to G/Z(G), it follows
that there are p2n inner automorphisms. It also follow from a simple counting argument on
all possible choices of di and d
′
i. From our understanding of the inner automorphisms, the
following proposition is clear:
Proposition 6.1. An automorphism φ of G is an inner automorphism if and only if it is
the identity on Z(G) and G/Z(G). The inner automorphisms commute and constitutes the
group of central automorphisms.
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It is known [17, 3E], H/I is isomorphic to Sp(2n, p). Recall that G/Z(G) is a symplectic
vector space over Fp. We next show that the extra-special p-group of prime exponent is a
favorable p-group.
Theorem 6.2. For a odd prime p, the extra-special p group of exponent p is a favorable
p-group.
Proof. Let φ ∈ Sp(2n, p), such that χφ is irreducible. From the above discussion, we can
consider φ to be an automorphism of G that is the identity on G′. According to Lemma
4.5, there are no proper φ-invariant subspaces of G/G′, and from Lemma 5.2 φ is a p′-
automorphism. Now assume that H is a proper φ-invariant subspace of G. Then consider
HG′. Notice that G′ = Φ(G) and furthermore Φ(G) is the set of non-generators of G. Then
it follows that HG′ is a proper subgroup and so HG′/G′ is a proper φ-invariant subspace of
G/G′. Which implies that HG′ ⊆ G′ and furthermore H ⊆ G′. •
Corollary 6.3. For a odd prime p, the extra-special p-group of exponent p is self-critical.
Proof. Let G denote the extra-special p-group of exponent p and C be a critical subgroup
of G. Then the condition CG(C) = Z(G) implies that C is not contained in Z(G). From
the above theorem G is a favorable p-group. Then there is a corresponding automorphism
φ. Let V = G/G′ and construct Vφ and it is known to be simple. Consider the subgroup
CG′. Then CG′ is either the whole group or the center Z(G). Since it can’t be Z(G), it is
the whole group. Now notice that G′ = Φ(G) and Φ(G) is the set of non-generators of G. It
follows that if CG′ = G, C = G. So G is self-critical. •
6.2. The case when p = 2. In this case a theorem of Winter [17, Theorem 1(c)] comes in
handy.
Theorem 6.4. Let P be an extra-special group of order 22n+1. Subgroups H and I are
as defined earlier. Then H/I is isomorphic to the orthogonal group Oε(2n, 2) of order
2n(n−1)+1(2n − ε)
n−1∏
i=1
(22i − 1). Here, ε = 1 if P is isomorphic to the central product of
n dihedral groups of order 8 and ε = −1 if P is isomorphic to the central product of n − 1
dihedral group of order 8 and a quaternion group.
From the above theorem, by selecting appropriate matrix with irreducible characteristic
polynomial, it is easy to see that the case p = 2 follows the exact same pattern as that of
p 6= 2. So we won’t dwell with p = 2 any further.
7. MOR cryptosystems on finite p-groups using p-automorphisms
In the last section we looked at the p′-automorphisms. Now we look at the p-automorphisms.
Our standard reference for p-automorphisms is Khukhro [7].
To recall, we looked at the exponent-p central series of a p-group. It is known that this
series has elementary abelian sections. There are two cases with p-automorphisms.
a: The automorphism φ is not identity on at least one section of the series.
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b: The automorphism φ is identity on all the sections.
In the case a above, one can not build a secure MOR cryptosystem. The reason is as
follows:
Theorem 7.1. Let V be a vector space over Fq, a field of characteristic p > 0. Let φ be a
p-automorphism. Then φ can be written as a block-diagonal matrix with 1 in the diagonal.
Phrased differently, all the eigenvalues of φ are 1.
Proof. The theorem is well-known, see [7, Theorem 2.5]. •
Once we have this theorem, the fact that the discrete logarithm problem in that matrix is
easy follows from the following observation and the fact that the power of a block diagonal is
the power of the respective blocks written as a block diagonal matrix maintaining the order
of the block: 

1 1 ∗ . . . ∗
0 1 1 . . . 0
... 0
. . .
. . .
...
0 . . . . . . 0 1


m
=


1 m ∗ . . . ∗
0 1 m . . . 0
... 0
. . .
. . .
...
0 . . . . . . 0 1


.
This proves that the case a above is useless.
However, the case b above is of immense interest to us. We will give an example of this
kind of automorphism. The reason for immense interest is as follows: anyone who is trying
to build a new cryptosystem, will want to build a new cryptosystem. In the case of p′-
automorphisms, in the MOR cryptosystem we saw, the security can be reduced to that of
the discrete logarithm problem in matrices. The discrete logarithm problem in matrices is
not a new cryptographic primitive. In this case (b above) we have a real good possibility of
a new cryptographic primitive.
Let us look at the situation in some details. There are two subgroups of the automorphism
group that we are interested in. One is the group of central automorphisms and the other is
the group of inner automorphisms.
7.1. Central automorphisms. Most central automorphisms are p-automorphisms. To
quote Curran and McCaughan [2], “So, roughly speaking, most of the central automorphisms
are of p-power order”.
Central automorphisms are the centralizer of the group of inner automorphisms in the
automorphism group, they form a normal subgroup in the automorphism group. Let φ be
a central automorphism, then φ(g) = gzg, zg ∈ Z(G). It is clear from the definition that
central automorphisms centralize the commutator subgroup. Now take an example of a
finite p-group G, such that Z(G) ⊆ G′. In this group, for a g ∈ G, we have φ(g) = gzg
and φm(g) = gzmg . So from g
−1φ(g) and g−1φm(g), the discrete logarithm problem in the
automorphism φ reduces to the discrete logarithm problem in zg ∈ Z(G). This is exactly
the case with the extra-special p-group (see Proposition 6.1). In the case of the extra-special
p-group of prime exponent, a central automorphisms acts as the identity in both Z(G) and
G/Z(G). So the obvious way to reduce an automorphism to matrices over Fp do not work.
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However in this case, as demonstrated earlier, it reduces to the discrete logarithm problem in
the center. The open question is, can their be other (secure) situations in which the discrete
logarithm problem in the automorphism is not the discrete logarithm problem in the usual
sense.
7.2. Inner automorphisms. The group of inner automorphisms of a p-group G is a p-
group. Let G = G1 D G2 D . . . D Gk = 1 be a sequence of subgroups in a p-group G. Let
g ∈ CG(G2) be an element. Then consider the inner automorphism φ such that φ(x) = g
−1xg.
Then clearly, φ acts as the identity on Gi for i ≥ 2 and Gi/Gi+1 for i ≥ 1. However, this is
not enough. Recall that our target is, φ should act like the identity on all possible sections
H/K where φ fixes K and H/K is elementary-abelian. The question is, are there p-groups,
on which, using the inner automorphisms, one can build a secure MOR cryptosystem?
8. Conclusion
This paper is a study of finite p-groups for the MOR cryptosystem. The aim of this paper
was not to provide with a secure MOR cryptosystem. For that, one can look into the arXiv
preprint [10]. The purpose of this paper is to theoretically justify what can one expect out
of finite p-groups. There are two classes of automorphisms one should look at. One is p-
automorphisms and the other is p′-automorphisms. The case of p′-automorphism has been
resolved in this paper as follows: for abelian groups, it is the elementary-abelian p-groups.
For non-abelian groups, one should use the extra-special p-groups of exponent p. However
there are very interesting questions that are open for p-automorphisms. We point those out
in this paper.
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